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THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE - A TAX IN PENAL

CLOTHING -OUGHT THE JUDGES TO CLOSE
THEIR EYES ON THE CONSTITUTION, AND
ONLY SEE THE LAW?
INTRODUCTION
2

New taxes are always contentious among the electorate. Taxes
that are collected to fund the undertakings of private companies, such as
those collected by states during the nineteenth century to fund the construc-

tion of privately owned railroads, have tended to be particularly unpopular.3 26 U.S.C. § 5000A ("Individual Mandate") imposes a tax on Americans of certain means who fail to purchase health insurance products from
privately owned insurance companies. 4
Despite indications that the Individual Mandate was intended by
Congress to be a penalty authorized by the Commerce Clause, when several states challenged the Individual Mandate's constitutionality before the
Supreme Court, the Federal Government also argued that the Taxing and
Spending Clause 6 authorized it. 7 The Court held that the Individual Mandate was beyond Congress's Commerce Clause authorities, but was within
those authorities granted by the Taxing and Spending Clause.8
Although the Supreme Court controversially expanded Congress's
powers under the Commerce Clause after 1937, it retained the authority to

I

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 179 (1803); see infra note 36 (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. at

179).
2 See infra note 39 and accompanying text (discussing political consequences of taxes being
unpopular).
3 See infra note 49 and accompanying text (describing public outrage brought on by corrupt
relationships between railroads and state legislatures).
4 See infra text accompanying note 19 (describing Individual Mandate).
5 See U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 3 (authorizing Congress to regulate interstate commerce); see
also infra note 22 and accompanying text (describing federal government's initial position that
Individual Mandate was penalty authorized by Commerce Clause).
6 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (authorizing Congress to tax and spend pursuant to "general Welfare"). This clause also authorizes Congress to tax and spend pursuant to the "common
defence," but, as there has been no indication that the Individual Mandate is defensible as a national security measure, this note will remain focused on the "general Welfare" language. See id.
7 See infra note 23 and accompanying text (describing Solicitor General Verrilli's argument
that Individual Mandate is permissible under Taxing and Spending Clause).
8 See infra note 25 and accompanying text (describing holding in Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus.
v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012)).
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define meaningful qualitative limits on Commerce-Clause Powers. 9 Conversely, the Court has abdicated virtually all of its qualitative definitional
power to Congress regarding the Taxing and Spending Clause.10 Several
regulatory forces also promote those companies' insurance products, including Congress being allowed to levy a tax against those who refuse to
purchase health insurance from privately owned companies. 1 As a result
of these advantages, coupled with the Supreme Court abdicating its definitional authority regarding the term "general Welfare" in the Taxing and
Spending Clause, Congress may now wield the authority bestowed by this
clause 12 as a constitutionally suspect, inefficient regulatory incentive for
individuals to purchase private companies' products.13
This note will first describe how the Individual Mandate was
passed, and relate commentary from many proponents and opponents of the
law.14 It will then discuss the history of judges interpreting both states' and
the federal government's taxing powers. 15 Following this is an analysis of
whether the Individual Mandate adheres to the constitutional requirement
that federal taxes serve the "general Welfare." 16 The conclusion collects
portions of this note that support an argument that the Individual Mandate
does not serve the "general Welfare," and that offer strategies for challenging its constitutionality in court. 17
9 See infra notes 51, 52 and accompanying text (describing rule created by, and criticisms of,
Supreme Court's expansion of Commerce Clause).
10 See infra note 38 and accompanying text (describing Supreme Court's deference to Congress's definition of "general Welfare" mentioned in Commerce Clause); see also infra text accompanying note 32 (explaining quantitative limits); accord infra note 33 and accompanying text
(explaining difference between qualitative and quantitative).
11 See infra notes 57-60 and accompanying text (describing regulatory advantages to promoting large scale employer-provided health insurance).
12 This note addresses only Congress's authority to collect taxes under the Taxing and
Spending Clause, and the types of behavior that Congress may permissibly attempt to induce by
doing so. Although Congress's authority under the Taxing and Spending Clause to spend tax
revenues toward one end or another, or to condition such expenditures on state cooperation with a
federal program, was an issue in Sebelius, it is beyond the scope of this note. See Sebelius, 132 S.
Ct. at 2607 (holding conditions on expenditures to states under Affordable Care Act unconstitutional).
13 See Thomas C. Buchmueller & Alan C. Monheit, Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance
and the Promise of Health Insurance Reform 23, (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14839, 2009), available at http://goo.gl/935qM9 (case sensitive) ("[T]here are some who
believe that the inefficiencies and inequities of the current system are so significant that it is time
to replace [it with] a system of individually-purchased coverage."); accord infra note 48 (describing corruption resulting from state legislature wielding taxing power on private railroad's behalf).
14 See infra Part 1.
15 See infra Part II.
16 See infra Part III.
17 See infra Part IV.; accord infra note 43 and accompanying text (explaining procedure for
challenging Individual Mandate's constitutionality).
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I. FACTS
In 2010, as part of an overhaul of federal healthcare law," Congress passed the Individual Mandate, which imposes an exaction on Americans who fail to purchase health insurance and do not fall into one of several exempted groups, such as the poor and the incarcerated.1 9 Several
parties, including states, private organizations, and individuals, brought
suits alleging that the Individual Mandate was beyond Congress's authorities under both the Commerce Clause and the Taxing and Spending

18

See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 18001-18121 (2010) [here-

inafter Act].
19 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(d)(1)-(5) (2010) (describing various groups who are exempt from exaction even if refusal to purchase health insurance). The Individual Mandate was designed such
that it "will add millions of new consumers to the health insurance market, increasing the supply
of, and demand for, health care services, and will increase the number and share of Americans
who are insured." 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(C) (2010). It will be imposed in 2014, and the Congressional Budget Office estimates that in 2016, six million people will be required to pay the exaction, which will be either $695 or 2.5% of an individual's income, whichever is greater. See
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, PAYMENTS OF PENALTIES FOR BEING UNINSURED UNDER
THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT, 1 (2012), available at http://goo.gl/orFwo (case sensitive). In ad-

dition to the Individual Mandate, Congress enacted a so-called Employer Mandate, codified at 26
U.S.C. § 4980H (2010), which would have also become effective in 2014, but the administration
delayed its enforcement for a year in response to concerns expressed by businesses that would
have been subject to it and by the unions of their employees. See Valerie Jarrett, We're Listening
to Businesses about the Health Care Law, THE WHITE HOUSE BLOG (July 02, 2013, 6:00 PM),
http://goo.gl/PrZQHk (case sensitive) ("In our ongoing discussions with businesses we have
heard that you need the time to get this right. We are listening. So in response to your concerns,
we are making two changes."); Avik Roy, Labor Unions: Obamacare Will 'Shatter' Our Health
Benefits, Cause 'Nightmare Scenarios',FORBES (July 15, 2013, 10:12 AM), http://goo.gl/STkBza
(case sensitive) ("[R]epresentatives of three of the nation's largest unions fired off a letter to Harry Reid and Nancy Pelosi, warning that Obamacare would 'shatter not only our hard-earned
health benefits, but destroy the foundation of the 40 hour work week that is the backbone of the
American middle class."'). Since the White House announced the delay of the Employer Mandate, members of Congress and others have called for a similar delay of the Individual Mandate.
See Jonathan Weisman & Robert Pear, Seeing Opening, House G.O.P. Pushes Delay on Individual Mandate in Health Law, N.Y. TiMES, July 9, 2013, at A15, available at http://goo.gl/3F1NyD
(case sensitive) ("House leaders began devising strategies that would most likely start this month
with multiple votes, the first to codify the one-year delay on the employer mandate, then another
to demand a delay on the individual mandate.").
A bill was introduced in the House of Representatives that would repeal the Individual Mandate, H.R. 1200, 113th Cong. § 1003(b) (2013),
available at http://goo.gl/L82yy7 (case sensitive), and Republicans in the House of Representatives forced a government shutdown while demanding a number of concessions, including a delay to the Individual Mandate, which a number of Democrats came to support after a troublesome
rollout of federal online healthcare exchanges called for by the Act. See Marc A. Thiessen, Delaying the individual mandate won't fix Obamacare, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 2013, available at
http://goo.gl/yjIRwa (case sensitive) ("Remember when Democrats voted to keep the government
shut down rather than accept a delay in the individual mandate? Now that the Obamacare implosion is dominating the news, they are falling over each to see who gets credit for a delay.").
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Clause. 20

These cases originated in several circuits, and the Court granted
Certiorari to review the decision of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals,
which held that the Individual Mandate was beyond Congress's Commerce
Clause authority, in that it was a penalty, not a tax, and therefore could not
pass under the Taxing and Spending Clause. 21 Although the Federal Government's initial brief before the Supreme Court indicated that it viewed
the Individual Mandate as a penalty rather than a tax,22 Solicitor General
Verrilli argued that the Individual Mandate was authorized by both the
Commerce Clause, and the Taxing and Spending Clause. 23 The Obama
20 Brief in Response for Private Respondents, Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.

Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-393), 2011 WL 4874089, at *10 [hereinafter Private Brief]; Brief for
State Respondents, Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566 (No. 11-393), 2011 WL 5007904, at *9 [hereinafter
States' Brief]; Consolidated Brief for Respondents, Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (No. 11-393), 2011
WL 4941020, at *9 [hereinafter Federal Brief]. While the argument that the Individual Mandate
was authorized by the Necessary and Proper Clause, U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18, was made by
several parties, it was ultimately rejected and is not germane to this note. See Sebelius, 132 S.Ct.
at 2591-93, 2647.
21 Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 603 (2011), cert. granted,80 U.S.L.W.
3293 (U.S. Nov. 14, 2011) (No. 11-393); Florida v. United States Dept. of Health & Human
Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1311, 1320 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding Individual Mandate beyond Congress's authority under Commerce and Taxing and Spending Clauses).
22 FederalBrief, supra note 20, at *19 n.9 ("[The Individual Mandate] consistently refers
to
the exaction it imposes for failure to maintain minimum essential coverage as a 'penalty."').
23 Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2595-96 (2012) (citing Bailey
v.
Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20, 36-37 (1922)) (also known as Child Labor Tax Case) (articulating three-prong test for assessing permissibility of exaction under Taxing and Spending
Clause); Transcript of Oral Argument of Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., on Behalf of Petitioners, Dep't of
Health and Human Servs. v. Florida, No. 11-398, 2012 WL 1017220, at *49 (U.S. Mar. 27, 2012)
(No. 11-398) [hereinafter Transcript of Oral Argument] ("[N]ot only is it fair to read this as an
exercise of the tax power, but this Court has got an obligation to construe it as an exercise of the
tax power, if it can be upheld on that basis."). Just before making this argument, Solicitor General Verrilli referenced Senator Max Baucus arguing that the Individual Mandate is a valid exercise of Congress's Taxing and Spending authority on the floor of the Senate during a December
23, 2009, Point of Order. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra, at *48 (citing ConstitutionalPoint
of Order with respect to the Reid Substitute Amendment to H.R. 3590, the Service Members Home
Owners Tax Act, (C-Span television broadcast Dec. 23, 2009), available at http://goo.gl/2n9wd
(case sensitive) (4:30:22-4:31:11; 5:34:31-5:35:14; 5:50:57) (responding to Point of Order regarding Individual Mandate's constitutionality by defending it as tax) ("The floor sponsor, Senator
Baucus, defended it as an exercise of the taxing power. In his response to the point of order, the
Senate voted 60 to 39 on that proposition.")). During oral arguments, Chief Justice Roberts asked
why the Individual Mandate had been called a penalty if it was actually a tax; judging by his apparent satisfaction with Solicitor General Verrilli's response that the name was designed to increase efficacy, this may have been the moment when the Chief Justice decided how he would go
about saving the law.
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra, at *49 ("CHIEF JUSTICE
ROBERTS: You're telling me they thought of it as a tax, they defended it on the tax power. Why
didn't they say it was a tax? GENERAL VERRILLI: They might have thought, Your Honor, that
calling it a penalty as they did would make it more effective in accomplishing its objective ...
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, that's the reason. They thought it might be more effective if
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Administration and other public officials have sent mixed signals as to
whether they view the Individual Mandate as a tax or a penalty. 24
The Supreme Court upheld the part of the Eleventh Circuit's opinion regarding the Individual Mandate being beyond Congress's Commerce
Clause authority, but overturned another portion by holding that the Individual Mandate was within Congress's Taxing and Spending authority.2 5
The Court reasoned that statutorily, the Individual Mandate is a penalty,
rendering the Anti-Injunction Act26 -which would otherwise prevent the
suit from going forward-inapplicable, but that constitutionally, the Individual Mandate is a tax, allowing it to pass under the Taxing and Spending
Clause. 2 The only limits on the Taxing and Spending power that the Court

they called it a penalty.").
24 Before the Individual Mandate was passed, President Obama vehemently objected to it
being described as a tax, but once it was passed, his administration adopted this description themselves. Compare Interview by George Stephanopoulos with Barack Obama, United States President, in Wash., D.C. (Sept. 20, 2009), available at http://goo.gl/DypOb (case sensitive) (rejecting
notion that Individual Mandate is tax), with Robert Pear, Changing Stance, Administration Now
Defends Insurance Mandate as a Tax, N.Y. TiMES, July 17, 2010, at A14, available at
http://goo.gl/FuJb (case sensitive) ("Administration officials say the tax argument is a linchpin of
their legal case in defense of the health care overhaul and its individual mandate .... "). Another
instance of apparent disingenuity on President Obama's part involves his promise that people
could keep their current plans when Obamacare took effect, followed by hundreds of thousands of
people receiving notices from their insurers that, due to Obamacare, their plans would be discontinued, and experts predicting that "as many as 16 million people could have their health plans
canceled because they don't meet the new requirements of Obamacare." Thiessen, supra note 19.
Other governmental and industry groups also had varying views as to whether the Individual
Mandate was a tax or a penalty.
Compare NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE
COMMISSIONERS, AMERICAN HEALTH BENEFIT EXCHANGE MODEL ACT § 6(J) (2011), available
at http://goo.gl/JPlypk (case sensitive) (referring to Individual Mandate as "individual responsibility penalty") (emphasis added), and Letter from Emily S. McMahon, Acting Assistant Sec'y of
Tax Policy, Dept. of the Treasury, to The Honorable Madeleine Z. Bordallo, U.S. House of Representatives (Oct. 19, 2011), available at 2011 WL 5118766 (referring to "individual responsibility penalty under section 5000A") (emphasis added), with Emily S. McMahon, Assistant Sec'y of
Tax Policy, U.S. Dept. of the Treasury, Douglas H. Shulman, Comm'r, I.R.S. & William J. Wilkins, Chief Counsel, I.R.S., Joint Statement, 2011-2012 Priority Guidance Plan, OFFICE OF TAX
POLICY AND INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., Sept. 2, 2011, available at 2011 WL 7630290, at *9
(listing "penalty imposed for failure to maintain minimum essential coverage" under "General
Tax Issues"); see generally Maximilian Held, Go Forth and Sin [Tax] No More: Important Tax
Provisions, and Their Hazards, in the Patient Protection and Affordable CareAct, 46 GONZ. L.
REv. 717, 726-27 (2011) (discussing sundry characterizations of Individual Mandate as tax and
penalty).
25 See Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2594-95 (holding Individual Mandate is within Taxing and
Spending Clause authority); id. at 2589 (Roberts, C.J.) (opining that Individual Mandate is beyond Congress's Commerce Clause authority); id. at 2644 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, JJ.,
dissenting) (opining that Individual Mandate is beyond Congress's Commerce Clause authority).
26 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) (2012).
27 See Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2584 ("The Affordable Care Act does not require that the penalty for failing to comply with the individual mandate be treated as a tax for [statutory] purposes..
. . The Anti-Injunction Act therefore does not apply to this suit, and we may proceed to the mer-
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discussed were the distinction between permissible taxes and impermissible
21
penalties, and between direct and in-direct taxes.
29
Although Chief Justice Roberts quoted from Marbury v. Madison
in his Sebelius opinion, he spent no time discussing the definitional authority enshrined in Marbury as it relates to the words "general Welfare" in the
Taxing and Spending Clause.30 After dispensing with the argument that the
Individual Mandate was a direct tax, the Chief Justice only discussed the
quantitative difference between penalties and taxes, which centers on the
amount of money to be exacted rather than any qualitative limits as to the
ends that can justify a particular exaction under the Taxing and Spending
Clause.31
Quantitative limits only alter a thing's magnitude or degree: the
difference between a tax and a penalty depends not on the character of the
exaction in question, but primarily on its size.3 2 Qualitative limits essenits."); id. at 2598 ("Congress had the power to impose the exaction in [the Individual Mandate]
under the [Taxing and Spending Clause of the U.S. Constitution], and [the Individual Mandate]
need not be read to do more than impose a tax."); see also 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) ("[N]o suit for the
purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by
any person .... ).
28 Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2596. An exaction that imposes a heavy burden such as to deny
genuine choice, that has a scienter requirement (i.e., 'knowingly'), and that is enforced by an
agency aside from the I.R.S., is likely a penalty, not a tax. ld. (citing Child Labor Tax Case, 259
U.S. at 36-37). The U.S. Constitution forbids exacting direct taxes without apportioning such
exactions among the states, but only capitations (taxes owed by virtue of one's being alive or deciding to vote), real estate taxes, and taxes on income derived from real estate have been deemed
direct taxes for purposes of this constitutional provision; therefore, the Individual Mandate is not
a direct tax. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4 (requiring that direct taxes laid by Congress be "in
Proportion to the Census"); Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2598-99 (explaining how capitations and real
estate taxes, unlike Individual Mandate, are direct taxes). Two commentators have suggested that
the Individual Mandate should have been struck down as a direct tax, but, notwithstanding the
authors' arguments to the contrary, because the amount that a person has to pay under the Mandate will often depend on his income level, the Sixteenth Amendment forecloses this argument.
See Robert J. Muise & David Yerushalmi, Wearing the Crown of Solomon? Chief Justice Roberts
and the Affordable Care Act "Tax," 38 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 291, 298 (2013) ("[T]he
chief justice's foray into tax law to save the PPACA's mandate ran roughshod over a longstanding distinction between direct taxes and indirect taxes .... "); see also U.S. CONST. amend.
XVI (exempting federal income tax from requirement that direct taxes be apportioned).
29 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
30 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1(authorizing Congress to tax and spend pursuant to "general Welfare"); Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2579 ("Our deference in matters of policy cannot, however,
become abdication in matters of law. 'The powers of the legislature are defined and limited; and
that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written."' (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176 (1803))); see also Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2566 (lacking any discussion of judicially defining "general Welfare" mentioned in Taxing and Spending Clause).
31 See supra notes 27, 28 and accompanying text (describing Court's holding and reasoning
in Sebelius).
32 See G.W.F. HEGEL, THE LOGIC OF HEGEL 200, § 106 (William Wallace trans., 2d ed.
1959) (1873), available at http://goo.gl/8SF2Zq (case sensitive) ("[1]n quantity we have an alter-
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tially alter what a thing is: an exaction used as a means to provide for the
general welfare is qualitatively different than one used for the benefit of
private parties.33
II. HISTORY
Our founding fathers were debating the ends toward which the federal taxing power might permissibly be exercised before the Constitution
was ratified; James Madison advocated for a narrow interpretation, and Alexander Hamilton a broader one.3 4 However, the Supreme Court's earliest
discussions of Congress's authority under the Taxing and Spending Clause
declared that it was limited only by a distinction between direct and indirect taxes, with no mention 3of
any requirement imposed by the words "gen5
eral Welfare" in that clause.

able, which in spite of alterations still remains the same."); Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2651 (Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting) (explaining that purported tax being too "onerous"
will render it penalty).
33 See David Gray Carlson, Hegel's Theory of Quantity, 23 CARDOZO L. REv. 2027, 2038-39
n.38 (2002) (citing Herbert Marcuse, HEGEL'S ONTOLOGY AND THE THEORY OF HISTORICITY, 64

(Seyla Benhabib trans., 1987)) ("Quality is...
the character identical with being: so identical that a
thing ceases to be what it is, if it loses its quality. Quantity... is the character external to being,
and does not affect the being at all. Thus e.g. a house remains what it is, whether it be greater or
smaller; and red remains red, whether it be brighter or darker."); see also James S. Liebman &
William F. Ryan, "Some Effectual Power": The Quantity and Quality of Decisionmaking Required of Article III Courts, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 696, 696 (1998) ("Encompassed within "[t]he
judicial Power" are five qualitative means to the overriding structural objective of national legal
supremacy: An Article III court must decide (1) the whole federal question (2) independently and
(3) finally, based on (4) the whole supreme law, and (5) impose a remedy that, in the process of
binding the parties to the court's judgment, effectuates supreme law and neutralizes contrary
law."); Dan Poulson, Note, Suspension For Beginners: Ex Parte Bollman and the Unconstitutionality of the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
373, 390 (2008) ("Crucially, [the Court's] qualitative power [under Marbury] is beyond the reach
of congressional interference.").
34 United States v.Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65-66 (1936). Madison asserted that the federal power
to tax was confined to Congress's constitutionally enumerated powers whereas Hamilton maintained that the taxing power is limited only by the requirement that it shall be exercised to provide
for the general welfare of the United States. Id. ("Mr. Justice Story, in his Commentaries, espouses the Hamiltonian position ....Study of all these leads us to conclude that the reading advocated by Mr. Justice Story is the correct one.").
35 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. 171, 175, 180-81, 183-84
(1796) (holding tax on carriages constitutional because not direct tax); Springer v. United States,
102 U.S. 586, 602 (1880) (alteration in original) ("Our conclusions are, that direct taxes, within
the meaning of the Constitution, are only capitation taxes, as expressed in that instrument, and
taxes on real estate ....
");Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 579 (1895) ("Be
this as it may, it is conceded in all these cases, from that of Hylton to that of Springer,that taxes
on land are direct taxes, and in none of them is it determined that taxes on rents or income derived
from land are not taxes on land." (emphasis added)). This direct versus indirect distinction was
essentially resolved by later precedent, as well as the Sixteenth Amendment, which exempted
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In Marbury, the Supreme Court used another constitutional limit
on the taxing power as a rhetorical device to underscore how important it is
for the Court to enforce qualitative constitutional limits on congressional
authority.3 6 Shortly thereafter, in another landmark decision, the Court
linked Congress's taxing power to the words "general Welfare" in the Constitution during a recitation of a number of Congress's constitutional powers. 3 However, it was eventually settled that "unless the choice is clearly
wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an exercise of judgment," it is for
Congress, not the Supreme Court, to define what the "general Welfare"

is.

38

Although the taxing power is very broad, the political unpopularity
of taxes has kept Congress from using it so extensively as to test all of its
boundaries. 39 Having a provision labeled as a penalty that is none-the-less
authorized by the Taxing and Spending Clause provides a powerful, if not
disingenuous, regulatory tool to counteract the unpopularity of taxation.40

federal taxes on income derived from real estate and personal property from constitutional apportionment requirements. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVI (exempting federal income tax from requirement that direct taxes be apportioned among states); Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2598-2599 (reviewing precedent and concluding that only direct taxes are those on real estate and capitations).
36 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 179 (1803) ("It is declared that 'no tax or duty shall
be laid on articles exported from any state.' Suppose a duty on the export of cotton, of tobacco, or
of flour; and a suit instituted to recover it. Ought judgment to be rendered in such a case? ought
the judges to close their eyes on the constitution, and only see the law." (quoting U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cl. 5)).
37 See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 381 (1819) ("Congress has power to lay and
collect taxes and duties, imposts and excises; to pay the debts, and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States .... " (emphasis added)).
38 Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937) (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1); see
also Edward S. Corwin, The Spending Power of Congress - Apropos the Maternity Act, 36
HARV. L. REv. 548, 580 (1923) ("[S]o far as [the Taxing and Spending] power goes, the 'general
welfare' is what Congress finds it to be.").
39 See David Orentlicher, Constitutional Challenges To the Health Care Mandate: Based In
Politics, Not Law, 160 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 19, 29 (2011) ("Congress and President
Barack Obama characterized the 2.5% levy as a penalty rather than a tax because they knew that
taxes are unpopular. It would be wrong, in this view, to allow Congress to disguise its motives
when enacting a statute and thereby make it more difficult for the public to hold members of
Congress responsible for their decisions." (citing Florida v. U.S. Dep't Health & Human Servs.,
716 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1142-43 (N.D. Fla. 2010) ("Because by far the most publicized and controversial part of the Act was the individual mandate and penalty, it would no doubt have been
even more difficult to pass the penalty as a tax. Not only are taxes always unpopular, but to do so
at that time would have arguably violated pledges by politicians (including the President) to not
raise taxes, which could have made it that much more difficult to secure the necessary votes for
passage. One could reasonably infer that Congress proceeded as it did specifically because it did
not want the penalty to be scrutinized as a $4 billion annual tax increase, and it did not want at
that time to be held accountable for taxes that they imposed." (internal quotation marks omitted)))).
40 See Robert Alt, Twisting a Statute Is Better Than Twisting the Constitution, SCOTUSBLOG
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Many commentators either do not appreciate, or deliberately disregard the
potential ramifications of the Supreme Court allowing Congress to use its
Taxing and Spending power to pass a law that the President and others insist is not a tax.4 1 Others, in response to Congress's perceived propensity
to misuse its Taxing and Spending power, have proposed procedures to facilitate taxpayer challenges to the legality of congressional expenditures
under the "general Welfare" provision of the Constitution. 42 Although it

(June 28, 2012, 6:27 PM), http://goo.gl/lYVAG (case sensitive) ("[Sebelius may] have created a
road map for Congress to craft future penalties - er, taxes - through which the federal government may regulate in areas heretofore beyond its power, and to do so without facing the political
heat for crafting a 'tax."').
41 See supra notes 22, 24 and accompanying text (discussing public officials' mixed signals
regarding whether Individual Mandate is tax or penalty); see e.g. Alberto R. Gonzales & Donald
B. Stuart, Note and Comment, What Implications Will the Supreme Court's Taxing Power Decision Have on the Goals of the Affordable Care Act and Healthcare?, 6 J. Health & Life Sci. L.
189, 224 (2013) ("As such, using the taxing power to influence behavior does not appear to be an
expansion of the taxing power by the Court."); Pamela S. Karlan, Foreword: Democracy and
Disdain, 126 HARv. L. REv. 1, 50-51 (2012) (discussing taxes' unpopularity as political disincentive without mentioning politicians' insistences that Individual Mandate not tax); Gillian E.
Metzger, Comment, To Tax, to Spend, to Regulate, 126 HARV. L. REv. 83, 112-15 (2012) (opining that Sebelius will impede judicial limitations on federal spending power, without discussing
taxing power); Martha Minow, Comment, Affordable Convergence: "Reasonable Interpretation"
and the Affordable Care Act, 126 HARv. L. REv. 117, 128 n.205 (2012) ("[T]he reasoning and
vote of the Chief Justice in this case [does not] foretell what he - or any other Justice - will do
in future cases."); Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, New Deal Lessons For The Affordable Care Act:
The General Welfare Clause, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY 5 (2012) ("[T]here
is not a constitutional crisis ... the controversy surrounding the Affordable Care Act, if a crisis at
all, is political."). But see Muise & Yerushalmi, supra note 28, at 298 ("Congress will employ the
elastic tool the chief justice has provided to mandate all sorts of behavior under the rubric of the
general welfare clause."). Although mentioning "Justice Stone famously telling Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins, who was struggling to find a constitutional basis for the Social Security Act:
'The taxing power, my dear, the taxing power. You can do anything under the taxing power."'
Metzger, supra at 91 (quoting Michelle Landis Dauber, The Sympathetic State, 23 LAW & HIST.
REV. 387, 388 (2005) (quoting in turn Frances Perkins, Address Delivered at Social Security
Headquarters in Baltimore, Md.: The Roots of Social Security (Oct. 23, 1962))), Dean Metzger
predicts that Congress may respond to restrictions that Sebelius puts on "what can count as a tax"
by refraining from using its taxing power, and instead exercising its Commerce Clause powers
more broadly. Metzger, supra at 111- 12. The potential for surreptitious use of the taxing power
also eluded four former Solicitors General who offered their opinions regarding Sebelius in a
New York Times article. See Theodore B. Olson, The Health Care Decision: Deliverance or
Disaster?Four Former Solicitors General Weigh in on Roberts' Ruling, TIME IDEAS, June 29,
2012, available at http://goo.gl/Id2zu (case sensitive). After lamenting at the unenviable position
that the Individual Mandate being upheld as a tax created for President Obama, former Solicitor
General Olson remarked that "[liberals'] version of federal power was vindicated [in Sebelius] but
only if they want to enact politically unpopular taxes," without mentioning the likelihood that,
despite their perils, the tactics used to sell the Individual Mandate as other-than a tax might be
repeated. ld. Former Solicitors General Waxman, Katyal, and Starr also offer their opinions regarding Sebelius, and each attempts to predict the lasting effect of Sebelius, but none mention its
potential effect on the contours of the federal taxing power. ld.
42 See John C. Eastman, Restoring the "General" to the General Welfare Clause, 4 CHAP. L.
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involves an exaction rather than an expenditure, such procedures could be
brought to bear on the Individual Mandate, 43 which some argue serves the
welfare of private insurers, rather than the general public.4 4

REV. 63, 87 (2001) ("It is time to restore the "general" to the General Welfare Clause, before
Congress eats out any more of our substance."); Robert G. Natelson, JudicialReview of Special
Interest Spending: The General Welfare Clause and the FiduciaryLaw of the Founders, 11 TEX.
REV. L. & POL. 239, 269-80 (2007) (discussing application of fiduciary law to taxpayers' challenges of expenditures' constitutionality).
43 A courageous taxpayer wishing to challenge the Individual Mandate's constitutionality
could refrain from paying it when it came due, wait for a Notice of Deficiency from the I.R.S.,
and then petition the United States Tax Court to review the Notice of Deficiency. See U.S. TAX
COURT INFORMATION ABOUT FILING A CASE IN THE UNITED STATES TAX COURT, available at
http://goo.gl/sUjtG (case sensitive) (explaining how to challenge Notice of Deficiency in Tax
Court). A taxpayer who wishes to take a more cautious tact could pay the Individual Mandate by
filing his tax return, file a Claim for Refund and Request for Abatement by sending a completed
I.R.S. Form 843 to the service center where he filed his tax return within three years of filing it,
having marked it to indicate that he is challenging the Individual Mandate as an excise tax. See
DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, I.R.S., FORM 843: CLAIM FOR REFUND AND REQUEST FOR
ABATEMENT (2011), available at http://goo.gl/LGOIO (case sensitive); DEP'T OF THE TREASURY,
I.R.S., INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 843 (2012), available at http://goo.gl/IflHF (case sensitive); see
also 26 U.S.C. § 6511(a) (2008) (imposing three-year statute of limitation); 26 U.S.C. § 5000A
(2010) (codified among "Miscellaneous Excise Taxes"). Then, assuming that his refund is not
granted, he could file suit in a federal district court or a federal court of claims, alleging that the
Individual Mandate was "illegally assessed or collected" because Congress lacked constitutional
authority to enact it. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (2013) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, concurrent with the United States Court of Federal Claims, of[] [a]ny civil action
against the United States for the recovery of any internal-revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed .... ); see also 26 U.S.C. § 7422(a) (1998) ("No suit or proceeding
shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any internal revenue tax alleged to have been
erroneously or illegally assessed or collected ... until a claim for refund or credit has been duly
filed with the Secretary .... "); United States v. Michel, 282 U.S. 656, 658 (1931) (construing §
7422(a)'s predecessor as waiver of sovereign immunity that would otherwise insulate government
from suit).
44 See Representative Michael Burgess, Providing For Considerationof Senate Amendments
to H.R. 4872, Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, 156 CONG. REc. 2418-06
(2013), available at 2010 WL 1133551 ("And what about the insurance companies, their stock
prices going up? Of course they went up. They got everything they wanted. What did they want
when this year started? They wanted an individual mandate and no public option."). The public
option that Representative Burgess referred to would have allowed Congress to create a publically
owned insurer to compete with private insurers in order to bring down costs. See David Gauvey
Herbert, Public Option, NATIONAL JOURNAL (Jan. 2, 2011, 10:22 PM), http://goo.gl/hfQHI (case
sensitive) (explaining public option). A version of the public option was passed by the House of
Representatives, see Health-Care Reform: How the Proposals Stack Up, WASH. POST,
http://goo.gllbxwgK7 (case sensitive), and it was more popular among voters than the Individual
Mandate, see Representative John Sarbanes, The Need For a Health Care Public Option, 155
CONG. REc. 11114-06 (2009), available at 2009 WL 3230977 ("A survey was done recently, and
the question was asked, Do you support an individual mandate, which is the requirement that
people purchase insurance coverage? In answer to that, there was some ambivalence. People
weren't so sure. Then they asked the question this way, they said, What if we give you a public
option, would you support an individual mandate? And a clear majority said, Absolutely, we
would."). Unlike the Individual Mandate, the public option failed in the Senate. Katharine Q.
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Seelye, Live Blogging: Senate Finance Committee Debate on Public Option, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
29, 2009, 10:08 AM), http://goo.gl/kqlDm (case sensitive) ("[T]he bill still went down to defeat,
with 10 in favor and 13 against. Again, no Republicans supported it."). Of the ten members of
Congress who have received the most financial support from the health insurance industry since
2004, none endorsed the public option. See Aaron Kiersh, Senators Opposed to "Public Option"
Haul in Health Care PAC Dollars, OPENSECRETS.ORG BLOC (June 22, 2009, 5:26 PM),
http://goo.gl/fafgI (case sensitive) (citing Nate Silver, Special Interest Money Means Longer
Odds for Public Option, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (June 22, 2009, 5:45 AM), http://goo.gl/3bcMeK
(case sensitive) ("In other words, the insurance industry's influence appears to swing about 9
votes against the public option.")); see also Anonymous, Committee Dems Voting Against Public Option Received Twice as Much Money from Health Insurers as Dems Voting Against Industry, MAPLIGHT (Sept. 30, 2009), http://goo.gl/0DsBG (case sensitive) (cataloging apparent correlation between politicians' support for public option and decrease in insurance lobby
contributions); Anonymous, Senators Supporting Public Option Received Half as Much Money
from Health Insurers, MAPLIGHT (Oct. 9, 2009), http://goo.gl/VPCPx (case sensitive) (same).
The appearance of the Individual mandate being precipitated by private-industry money is exacerbated by the fact that much of this lobbying activity went unreported, making it difficult to get
an accurate idea of how strong an influence it actually exercised, and the fact that, regarding another provision in the Affordable Care Act, Congressmen were caught reading statements authored by lobbyists directly into the Congressional Record. Michael Beckel, Public Option in
National Spotlight, But Rarely in Details of Lobbying Reports, OPENSECRETS.ORG BLOC (Feb.
24, 2010, 3:41 PM), http://goo.gl/hTPIO (case sensitive); Robert Pear, In House, Many Spoke
With One Voice: Lobbyists', N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2009, at AL, available at http://goo.gl/bnin2
(case sensitive). Sentiment from the medical community has also reflected how beneficial the
Individual Mandate is for established, large-scale private insurers. See Chris McGreal, Revealed:
Millions Spent by Lobby Firms Fighting Obama Health Reforms, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 1, 2009,
11:55 AM), http://goo.gl/spSHV (case sensitive) ("'It's a total victory for the health insurance
industry,' said Dr Steffie Woolhander, a GP, professor of medicine at Harvard University and cofounder of Physicians for a National Health Programme (PNHP).") Mr. McGreal went on to
quote Dr. Woodhandler as having said that the Individual Mandate "use[s] the coercive power of
the state to force people to hand their money over to a private entity which is the private insurance industry. That is not what people were promised." ld. He also reported that criticism over
the Act serving the interest of private insurers has been brought on by the fact that "Senator Max
Baucus, the single largest recipient of health industry political donations and chairman of the finance committee [played a central role in] draft[ing] the legislation .
I..."
Id. Another indication
that the Act, especially the Individual Mandate, is favorable to large insurers is the fact that their
largest national trade group pressed for an individual mandate years before the Act was passed.
AMERICA'S HEALTH INSURANCE PLANS, BOARD OF DIRECTORS' STATEMENT: Now IS THE TIME
FOR HEALTH CARE REFORM:
A PROPOSAL TO ACHIEVE UNIVERSAL COVERAGE
AFFORDABILITY, QUALITY IMPROVEMENT AND MARKET REFORM 6-7 (2008), available at
http://goo.gl/GSOiR (case sensitive) (advocating for imposition of penalty for those failing to purchase health insurance). Lobbyists' calls appear not to have gone unanswered, as is indicated by
a June 3, 2009 email from President Obama's healthcare adviser to a healthcare lobbyist describing concessions made in response to "how constructive you guys have been ....
Peter Baker,
Obama Was Pushed by Drug Industry, E-Mails Suggest, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2012, at AL, available at http://goo.gl/wj0Oj (case sensitive). The administration's friendliness toward private
business is also reflected in its decision to delay imposition of the Employer Mandate until 2015.
See Jarrett, supra note 19 ("In our ongoing discussions with businesses we have heard that you
need the time to get this right. We are listening. So in response to your concerns, we are making
two changes."). Within twenty-four hours of the House of Representatives casting its final vote
to send the Act to President Obama's desk, Russ Britt from the Wall Street Journal's MarketWatch forecasted increasing stock prices for a number of large corporations, which is another
indicator that both the Individual Mandate and the Act in general were designed to benefit large
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Some state courts recognized similar general welfare restrictions,
sometimes phrased as "public use," imposed by their states' constitutions.4 5
However, when it came to states collecting taxes to fund privately constructed railroads, eighteenth-century state courts were reluctant to impose

constitutional limits.46 Although many states were free to raise funds for
private railroad companies, they were foreclosed from regulating those railroads by the Dormant Commerce Clause, a judicial interpretation of the
federal Constitution that protects interstate commerce from state regulation.4 This deference to legislatures' fundraising, alongside strict limits on

corporations within the healthcare sector. See Russ Britt, Hospitals Gain, Insurers Fall, but is it a
Harbinger?, MARKETWATCH (Mar. 22, 2010, 4:20 PM), http://goo.gl/eSe6s0 (case sensitive)
("[F]ueled by the prospect of $940 billion in government assistance to help pay for the care it will
be giving, Tenet shares were up more than 9% at the close. Health Management Associates rose
even more, climbing 11.3%, . . . '[p]retty much everybody gets a pony, except for the taxpayers,'
said Les Funtleyder, analyst for Miller Tabak in New York ....");see also OFFICE OF THE
CLERK, U.S. H. REP., Final Vote Results For Roll Call 165 (Mar. 21, 2010, 10:49 PM),
http://goo.gl/7wBpDc (case sensitive) (relating vote count for House's final reconciliation vote on
Senate's amendments to Act). Mr. Britt noted that "insurers seemed to be taking it on the chin,
though that could be deceiving, says [Dave] Shove[, an analyst for BMO Capital Markets in New
York,]" and it appears that Mr. Shove was correct because the stocks of two of the three largest
health insurers that lost value the day after the House vote have since more than doubled in value.
See Stock Quotes for Humana and UnitedHealth Group (2010-2013), MARKETWATCH, available
at http://goo.gl/HqilVu (case sensitive) (showing Humana and UnitedHealth Group stock gains
in years since Act was passed by Congress); Britt, supra (describing deceptive appearance that
Act might be disfavorable to large health insurers).
45 See MASS. CONST. pt. 2, c. 1, § 1, art. 4 ("[The state legislature may] impose ... reasonable ... taxes.., under the hand of the governor of this commonwealth.., for the public service,
in the necessary defence and support of the government of the said commonwealth, and the protection and preservation of the subjects thereof.
...
). The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court considered a tax being imposed to raise money for a private owner of real estate destroyed
by a fire and concluded that because the tax was for private, and not public use, the tax was unconstitutional. Lowell v. City of Boston, 111 Mass. 454, 461 (1873) (citing id.).
Maine's Supreme Judicial Court ruled a similar tax, which was being imposed for the benefit of local manufacturers, unconstitutional. Allen v. Inhabitants of Jay, 60 Me. 124, 142 (1872) ("[To tax] ... for
purposes of private gain .. would be to withdraw [the tax funds] from the protection of the constitution and submit it to the will of an irresponsible majority .... No surer or more effectual
method could be devised.., to render property insecure, and.., paralyze industry.").
46 See Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadelphia, 21 Pa. 147, 175 (1853) (listing eight decisions
from different states' courts allowing for unlimited taxation to fund private railroads). Iowa's
Supreme Court courageously bucked the trend of allowing taxes to be raised for the benefit of
private railroads by declaring a law designed to do so contrary to the Iowa Constitution. Hanson
v. Vernon, 27 Iowa 28, 50 (1869) (comparing tax power to power of eminent domain). The Hanson case concerned "the levy of a tax for a specific, designated purpose." Id.The Hanson court
held that "[w]hether this [specific, designated] purpose be public or private, whether the money
thus required is in the nature of a tax or is an illegal exaction under the name and guise of a tax,
are judicial questions." Id.(emphasis in original).
47 See Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557, 563 (1886) (citing U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3) ("[T]he transportation in question falls within the proper description of
'commerce among the States,' and as such can only be regulated by the congress of the United
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their ability to regulate, fueled corrupt relationships between the large railroads and the legislatures enacting taxing policies favorable to them.4 8 In
response to this corruption, New Jersey convened a commission and
amended its constitution to allow for a greater degree of judicial oversight
in an attempt to stem corruption in the legislature, and Oregon passed a citizens' initiative that spurned taxation designed to benefit private railroads. 49
Around the same time that the Supreme Court decided Helvering,
and thereby abdicated its qualitative definitional authority regarding the
"general Welfare" mentioned in the Taxing and Spending Clause in, the
Court also allowed Congress to expand its authority under the Commerce
Clause. 50 Eventually it was settled that the Commerce Clause granted
States under the [Commerce Clause]."); see also Mehmet K. Konar-Steenberg & Anne F. Peterson, Forum, Federalism, and Free Markets: An Empirical Study of Judicial Behavior Under the
Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 80 UMKC L. REV. 139, 142-43 (2011) (reviewing dormant
Commerce Clause precedent).
48 See Hans W. Baade, Chapters in the History of the Supreme Court of Texas: Reconstruction and "Redemption" (1866-1882), 40 ST. MARY's L. J. 17, 169 (2008) (relating instance of
Texas Supreme Court's reluctance to condemn allegedly corrupt railroad legislation); Jon Lauck,
"The Organic Law of a Great Commonwealth ": The Framing of the South Dakota Constitution,
53 S.D. L. REV. 203, 249 (2008) (noting state legislature "was subject to corruption" in failing to
tax railroad company's land holdings); Dale F. Rubin, The Public Pays, the CorporationProfits:
The Emasculation of the Public Purpose Doctrine and a Not-For-Profit Solution, 28 U. RICH. L.
REV. 1311, 1317 (1994) ("Commentators have observed that public sentiment in favor of requiring, by constitutional amendment, states and local government to curtail their excessive propensities to incur debt and to spend tax monies, were in significant part based on the fraud by railroad
promoters and the corruption by public officials in subsidizing the construction of railway systems.").
49 See Paula Abrams, The Majority Will: A Case Study of Misinformation,Manipulation,and
the Oregon Initiative Process, 87 OR. L. REv. 1025, 1037 (2008) (arguing "[c]orporate officers,
bankers, and railroad magnates .. . control[ing] the legislature" fomented "direct democracy
movement"); Peter J. Mazzei & Robert F. Williams, "Traces of Its Labors:" The Constitutional
Commission, the Legislature, and Their Influence on the New Jersey State Constitution, 18731875, 33 RUTGERS L. J. 1059, 1110 (2002) (citing George L.A. Reilly, The Camden and Amboy
Railroad in New Jersey Politics (1951) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University) (on
file with Widener Library, Harvard University) ("The unmitigated power of railroads and the
public's hope for a general railroad law to put an end to their abuses, was without question the
main state political news of the day." ). In Oregon, a slew of citizens' initiatives were passed,
some of which focused on ending corruption in the state legislature. See Abrams, supra at 1040.
50 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 3 ("Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes.
[for the] general Welfare of the United States .. . [and to] regulate Commerce ... among the

several States ....
");Alan R. Greenspan, The ConstitutionalExercise of the FederalPolice Power: A FunctionalApproach to Federalism,41 VAND. L. REv. 1019, 1022-38 (1988) (relating development of Commerce Clause from time of ratification forward). Although during the beginning of the twentieth century the Supreme Court took a narrow view of the Commerce Clause, by
"nullifying several New Deal efforts," it may have "fear[ed] ... President Franklin Roosevelt's
Icourt-packing' plan," whereby an incumbent president could appoint a new Supreme Court justice for every current justice over the age of 70, so the Court "reversed its course and began sustaining congressional use of the commerce power to regulate the national economy." Greenspan,
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Congress authority to regulate interstate commerce, its channels and instrumentalities, those economic activities that, when viewed in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce, and those non-economic activities that, even when disaggregated, individually have a substantial effect
51
on interstate commerce.
This expansion of the Commerce Clause has
• • • 52
been severely criticized>
The final caveat in the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause rule,
which distinguishes between economic and non-economic activity, is a
product of two recent decisions striking down federal criminal legislation
as beyond Congress's Commerce-Clause authority. Chief Justice Roberts
spent a significant portion of his Sebelius opinion discussing the limits of
the Commerce Clause that put the Individual Mandate outside of its reach,
supra at 1028 (upholding the National Labor Relation Board's orders regarding management
practices at fully-integrated national corporation (citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U.S. 1 (1937))); see also Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 132-33 (1942) (upholding Agriculture Adjustment Act of 1938); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 125 (1941) (upholding
wage, hour, and record-keeping requirements imposed by Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938).
51 See Stewart Jay, On Slippery ConstitutionalSlopes andthe Affordable CareAct, 44 CONN.
L. REV. 1133, 1145-69, 1208-12 (2012) (reviewing Commerce Clause precedent up to present
and concluding that Individual Mandate's fate is uncertain).
52 See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, The Unintended Consequences of Enhancing Gun Penalties:
Shooting Down the Commerce Clause and Arming Federal Prosecutors, 51 DuKE L.J. 1641,
1681 (2002) ("Thus the effect of enhancing the penalties [under the Commerce Clause] applicable
to gun-related crime has been to enlarge greatly the scope of the discretion exercised by federal
prosecutors and the magnitude of the consequences controlled by their discretion, without the
development of any additional checks against the abuse of this enhanced discretion."); Richard A.
Epstein, The ProperScope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REv. 1387, 1455 (1987) ("It is far
easier to keep power from the hands of government officials than it is to wrest it back from them
once it has been conferred. We had our chance with the commerce clause, and we have lost it.");
Arthur B. Mark, III, Annual Survey of the United States Supreme Court and FederalLaw: Casenotes United States v. Morrison, The Commerce Clause and the SubstantialEffects Test: No Substantial Limit on Federal Power, 34 CREIGHTON L. REv. 675, 751 (2001) ("If the Court is concerned about the reach of federal power into the lives of individuals, the Court ought to place a
principled limit on federal power under the Commerce Clause by returning to a test more in line
with its pre-New Deal understanding of the Commerce Clause."); Calvin Massey, The Role of
GovernmentalPurpose in ConstitutionalJudicialReview, 59 S.C. L. REv. 1, 12, 59 (2007) (citing
Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 105-25 (1941)) ("Perhaps that inquiry [into congressional purpose] is more
properly made when courts assess the scope of the substantive powers given to Congress; however, since United States v. Darby, the Court has eschewed any such scrutiny with respect to the
Commerce Clause power ....
Judicial consideration of governmental purposes is a necessary
part of constitutional adjudication, but courts have not formulated any guiding principles for the
exercise of that task."). But see Judith Resnik, Trial as Error,Jurisdictionas Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Article 111, 113 HARV. L. REv. 924, 1007 (2000) ("[W]hatever Congress
deems to be in need of national attention, be it kidnapping, alcohol consumption, bank robbery,
fraud, or nondiscrimination[, should be within its authority].").
53 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 609 (2000) (holding gender-motivated violence is non-economic activity and its individual effect on interstate commerce is insubstantial);
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561-62 (1995) (holding school-zone gun possession is noneconomic activity; its individual effect on interstate commerce is insubstantial).
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and four dissenting Justices agreed with him on this holding.5 4 There are
indications that this discussion has had a narrowing effect on the scope of
the authority granted by the Commerce Clause, but this is not certain.
When Sebelius was decided, employers provided health insurance
to over 57% of Americans who were both insured and employed in the private sector.
This type of health insurance became popular in part due to
federal policy decisions that excluded it from wage control laws, defined it
as an ordinary business expense as opposedS 57
to a taxable form of income,
5
and largely exempted it from state regulation.
The wage caps from which employer-based insurance are exempted were a part of the Wage Stabilization Act of 1942.58 Employer54 Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2589 (2012) (Roberts, C.J.) ("The
Framers gave Congress the power to regulate commerce, not to compel it .... ") (emphasis in
original); id. at 2644 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, JJ., dissenting) ("To be sure, purchasing
insurance is 'Commerce'; but one does not regulate commerce that does not exist by compelling
its existence.") (emphasis in original). Chief Justice Roberts spent more than 80% of his individual opinion (more than eight out of about ten pages) discussing the Commerce Clause and its limits. Id. at 2585-93 (Roberts, C.J.).
55 Compare Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2600-01 (arguing Commerce Clause's insufficiency not
dicta because Individual Mandate's penal appearance necessitated Commerce Clause analysis),
and United States v. Williams, No. 12460116-CR-RNS, 2012 WL 3242043, at *3 (S.D. Fla.
Aug. 7, 2012) (explaining Chief Justice Robert's Commerce Clause language in Sebelius), and
IND. CODE § 1-1-2.5-2 (6)(A)-(B) (2012) (declaring, in Sebelius' wake, that Indiana's intrastate
goods and services are beyond Commerce Clause authority), with United States v. Henry, 688
F.3d 637, 641 n.5 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing United States v. Stewart, 451 F.3d 1071, 1077-78 (9th
Cir. 2006)) ("[E]ven if [Sebelius] changed Supreme Court precedent regarding the Commerce
Clause, we conclude it would not overrule Stewart[, which upheld the proscription against machine gun ownership in 18 U.S.C. § 922 (o)(1) (2013).]"), and United States v. Spann, No. 3:12CR-126-L, 2012 WL 4341799, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 24, 2012) ("[T]his court is not prepared to
Iread the conglomeration of the dissenting opinion[s] of four Justices combined with the... opinion of Chief Justice John Roberts to constitute binding precedent interpreting the Commerce
Clause in a manner relevant to Congressional authority to regulate' felon possession of firearms
that have traveled in interstate commerce." (quoting United States v. Moore, No. CR-12-6023RMP, 2012 WL 3780343, at *3 (E.D. Wash. Aug. 31, 2012) (holding Chief Justice Robert's
Commerce Clause language in Sebelius not binding))), and Bradley W. Joondeph, The Affordable
Care Act and the Commerce Power: Much Ado About (Nearly)Nothing, 6 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI.
L. 2, 35 (2013) ("[Sebelius] jeopardizes no other extant federal laws, and it does not significantly
constrain Congress going forward."), and David Post, Commerce Clause "Holding v. Dictum
Mess" Not So Simple, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 3, 2012, 8:17 AM), http://goo.gl/Me8qH (case
sensitive) ("Courts don't have to be obeyed when they propound on something they didn't have
to propound upon for the purpose of deciding the case the way they decided it.").
56 Elizabeth Mendes, Fewer Americans Have Employer-Based Health Insurance, GALLUP
WELL-BEING (Feb. 14, 2012), http://goo.gl/XOKRg (case sensitive).
57 D. ANDREW AUSTIN & THOMAS L. HUNGERFORD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40834, THE
MARKET STRUCTURE OF THE HEALTH INSURANCE INDUSTRY 3-4, 22 (2010), available at

http://goo.gl/pFfef (case sensitive) (discussing employer-based insurance's advantages due to exemption from wage caps, income tax, and state regulation).
58 50 U.S.C. § 961 (1942) (repealed 1956). Within days of the Wage Stabilization Act becoming law, President Theodore Roosevelt issued an executive order exempting employer-
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provided health insurance being exempt from income taxation is a function
of a constellation of federal regulatory mechanisms, including an Internal
Revenue Service private letter ruling, Supreme Court precedent, and a federal statute. 59 Employer-provided health insurance being largely beyond
the reach of state regulation is a result of a federal statute designed to provide national standards and curb mismanagement and fraud called the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"). 60 These poli-

provided health insurance from the wage caps in the law. Providing for the Stabilizing of the National Economy, 7 Fed. Reg. 7871, 7873 (Oct. 6, 1942) ("Salaries and wages under this Order
shall include all forms of direct or indirect remuneration to an employee ... (excluding insurance
and pension benefits in a reasonable amount as determined by the Director) .... "). The National
Labor Relations Board also recognized this important distinction between wages and health insurance. See Atl. Basin Iron Works, Inc., 53 NLRB 621, 636 n.8 (1943) (listing terminationrelated expenses included in "net earnings" without mentioning cost of obtaining alternate insurance); Revlon Products Corp., 48 NLRB 1202, 1205 (1943) (awarding discrimination victim's
survivors both lost wages and insurance proceeds and distinguishing between the two); Buchmueller & Monheit, supra note 13, at 3 ("The link between employment and private health insurance was strengthened during World War II when in 1943 the War Labor Board ruled that controls over wages and prices imposed by the 1942 Stabilization Act did not apply to fringe
benefits such as health insurance.")
59 Epmeier v. United States, 199 F.2d 508, 511 (1952) ("The provisions of [the Internal Revenue Code] undoubtedly were intended to relieve a taxpayer who has the misfortune to become ill
or injured, of the necessity of paying income tax upon insurance benefits received to combat the
ravages of disease or accident."); 26 U.S.C. § 106 (a) (2013) ("[G]ross income does not include
contributions by the employer to accident or health plans for compensation (through insurance or
otherwise) to his employees for personal injuries or sickness .... "); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul., as reprinted in PRENTICE HALL FED. TAX SERV. 1943-44,
66,294 (1943); see also BOB LYKE,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34767, THE TAX EXCLUSION FOR EMPLOYER-PROVIDED HEALTH
INSURANCE: POLICY ISSUES REGARDING THE REPEAL DEBATE 7-8 (2008), available at

http://goo.gl/HP5ikf (case sensitive) ("Section 106 was enacted in 1954 as part of a comprehensive revision of the Internal Revenue Code .... Prior to 1954, there was no statutory provision
that explicitly allowed an exclusion for coverage under employer-provided accident and health
insurance .... A 1943 ruling held that an employer contribution for group medical and hospitalization insurance issued by a commercial insurer was exempt income to workers."); Employer
Health or Accident Plans: Taxfree Protectionand Proceeds, 21 U. CHI. L. REv. 277, 286 (1954)
("It would be possible to include [the amount an employee saves in premiums due to his employer insuring him] in the employee's income each year. Such a notion of income, however, seems
quite opposed to the traditional income tax concept, which looks upon income as the receipt
... of something of value which may be translated into cash, rather than the receipt of a mere
non-transferable promise to pay upon the happening of an uncertain future event.").
60 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 -1461 (2002) (exempting many forms of employer-provided health insurance from state regulation). While ERISA allows some regulation of employer-provided
health insurance that is purchased from an outside supplier, when an employer insures its own
employees' health, which over 80% of large employers do, it is completely exempt from state
regulation. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 732, 747 (1985) ("Plans
may self-insure or they may purchase insurance for their participants. Plans that purchase insurance-so-called 'insured plans'-are directly affected by state laws that regulate the insurance
industry ....
We are aware that our decision results in a distinction between insured and uninsured plans, leaving the former open to indirect regulation while the latter are not."); PATRICIA A.
BUTLER, NAT'L ACAD. FOR STATE HEALTH POLICY, ERISA PREEMPTION MANUAL FOR STATE
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cy decisions, which result in the majority of insured Americans' health
plans being tied to their current employer, have been severely criticized as
giving large-scale insurers unfair advantages over their smaller would-be
competitors.61
III. ANALYSIS
By purporting to narrow the development of Congress's powers
under the Commerce Clause, Sebelius provides Congress with an incentive
to find new Constitutional authority for measures of questionable constitutionality. 62 One such constitutionally suspect purpose is raising tax revenues, not for the general welfare, but to induce the purchase of products
from privately owned businesses.6 3
The federal government's use of its taxing power for the benefit of
private insurance companies bears many similarities to states' use of their
taxing powers for the benefit of private railroad companies in the 1800s,

HEALTH POLICYMAKERS 8 (2000), available at http://goo.gl/3ylkZ (case sensitive) (illustrating

federal and state spheres of influence regarding employer-provided health insurance); Buchmueller & Monheit, supra note 13, at 10 ("Roughly 80 percent of private sector establishments
with 500 or more employees choose to self-insure rather than purchase coverage directly.").
61 See AUSTIN & HUNGERFORD, supra note 57, at 51 ("Other aspects of health insurance can

reduce the sharpness of competition. Employers are typically reluctant to switch insurers, which
could require a major overhaul of human resources department procedures and a reorientation of
employees . . . tying health benefits to employment can reduce job mobility and hinder efficient
matching of workers to positions that make the best use of their skills"); LYKE, supra note 59, at
12, 17, 19 ("The exclusion thus contributes to what some economists consider an excess of insurance coverage and a significant welfare (or efficiency) loss for insured individuals and society as
a whole ... [and it] sometimes is criticized for providing tax savings when employers pay for the
insurance, while coverage purchased in the individual market generally has no tax savings....
For higher income taxpayers, the income tax savings would be greater."). Specifically, these policy decisions have been criticized as inefficiently encouraging the purchase of excessive insurance, and inequitably advantaging large-scale insurers over small scale ones, and high-income
employees over low-income ones. See Buchmieller & Monheit, supra note 13, at 23-24 (identifying four areas of concern posed by employer-provided health insurance); see also James A.J.
Revels, What Effect Will Health Reform Law Have on Businesses and the U.S. Economy?,
PHYSICIANS NEWS DIGEST (Aug. 21, 2012, 8:38 AM), http://goo.gl/Bycg6 (case sensitive) ("The

new mandate could cause businesses to lay off employees and even prevent them from hiring in
the future.").
62 See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text (describing Congress's Commerce Clause
powers pre-Sebelius); accord supra note 52 and accompanying text (describing criticisms that
Court had allowed Congress's Commerce Clause powers to become overbroad); supra note 25
and accompanying text (explaining holding in Sebelius); supra note 55 and accompanying text
(describing potentially slimming effect of Sebelius on Congress's Commerce Clause powers);
supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text (describing Sebelius' potential to lead to abuses of
Congress's taxing power).
63 See supra note 46 and accompanying text (describing state court holding that use of tax
power to fund private railroad violated state's constitution).
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such as the fact that the groups of private parties benefiting from the taxes
are both largely exempt from state regulations.6 4 This favorable treatment,
along with other incentives, such as tax breaks, exemption from wage control laws, and exemption from state regulation, give large insurance providers an unfair market advantage over smaller,
would-be competitors, which
65
decreases efficiency and increases costs.
The meaningful qualitative limits that the Supreme Court has defined for the Commerce Clause allowed it to prevent Congress from using
its power under that clause for the benefit of privately owned, large-scale
insurance companies. 66 However, by allowing the Individual Mandate to
pass under Congress's Taxing and Spending power-a power whose qualitative boundaries the Court has left to Congress to define-the Court has
opened the door to other exercises of this power that are even further removed from the "general Welfare." 6 Furthermore, the potentially limiting
effect that taxes' unpopularity has had on Congress's willingness to raise
them may now be ineffectual because-as was done with the Individual
Mandate-politicians may vehemently deny that an exaction is a tax in order to get it passed, and then count on the Supreme Court to allow them to
collect the exaction under Congress's Taxing and Spending power.68
By relinquishing virtually all of its qualitative definitional authority
64 See supra note 19 and accompanying text (describing exaction imposed by Individual
Mandate on those failing to purchase health insurance); accord supra note 47 and accompanying
text (explaining railroad companies' exemption from state regulation under Dormant Commerce
Clause); supra note 60 and accompanying text (explaining private insurers' exemption from state
regulation under ERISA). State governments funded private railroads by paying them tax revenues, and Congress is now helping large-scale insurers by taxing those who fail to purchase their
products; in both instances a net effect is for the private businesses to achieve larger revenues, so
the comparison between the two is apt.
65 See Buchmueller & Monheit, supra note 13, at 23-24 (describing opinion that current system of employer-provided health insurance is inefficient and inequitable); supra notes 57-59, 61
and accompanying text (explaining large insurers' tax breaks, regulatory exemptions, and unfair
advantage they thereby obtain).
66 See supra note 51 and accompanying text (explaining limits that Court has placed on Congress's power under Commerce Clause); see also supra note 25 and accompanying text (describing Court's holding that Individual Mandate was beyond Congress's Commerce Clause powers).
67 See supra note 6 and accompanying text (describing Congress's Constitutional power to
tax and spend pursuant to "general Welfare"); accord supra note 38 and accompanying text (describing Court's holding that Congress controls definition of "general Welfare" in Taxing and
Spending Clause); supra note 25 and accompanying text (describing Court's holding in Sebelius
that Individual Mandate was within Congress's Taxing and Spending power); supra note 40 and
accompanying text (describing potential expansion of congressional taxing power under Sebelius).
68 See supra note 39 and accompanying text (describing effect of taxes' unpopularity on decision to initially label Individual Mandate as penalty); see also supra note 24 and accompanying
text (describing Obama administration's change of position regarding Constitutional authorization for Individual Mandate).
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under Marbury regarding exactions under the Taxing and Spending clause,
the Supreme Court has now relegated itself to a quantitative role, thereby
allowing unbridled expansion as to the types of behavior Congress may attempt to induce by taxing those who do otherwise. 69 The only remaining
qualitative judicial limit on Congress's taxing power is a ban against taxes
that, relative to the "general Welfare," are "clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an exercise of judgment,"' v and neither Sebelius, nor any
subsequent federal cases, address whether the Individual Mandate meets
that standard. 1
It is not beyond imagination that the Supreme Court might muster
the courage that the Iowa Supreme Court exercised in 1869 when it held,
regarding "the levy of a tax for a specific, designated purpose," that
"[w]hether this purpose be public or private, whether the money thus required is in the nature of a tax or is an illegal exaction under the name and
guise of a tax, are judicial questions."' 2 However, it is unlikely that such a
holding will appear in the United States Reports any time soon, especially
in light of the fact that the Court recently quoted Marbury as standing for
the fact that "deference in matters of policy cannot ... become abdication
in matters of law,"'' and in the same opinion contravened Marbury's admonition 74to judges not to "close their eyes on the constitution, and only see
the law."

69 See supra note 36 and accompanying text (relating Court's mention of qualitative limit on
taxing power in Marbury). If the Court had retained more of its authority to define qualitative
limits on Congress' taxing power, it could more easily prevent Congress from taxing those who
do not purchase private companies' products by holding that such taxes are not in the "general
Welfare." See sources cited supra note 33 and accompanying text (explaining relevance of difference between quality and quantity to Court's powers under Marbury). Instead, the Supreme
Court's primary power to prevent congressional misuse of the taxing power is to declare an exaction so "onerous" as to preclude "genuine choice," which is a purely quantitative inquiry. See
supra note 32 and accompanying text (explaining standard that Supreme Court applies to distinguish taxes from penalties); see also Metzger, supra note 41, at 111 (opining that Sebelius's holding that tax's constitutionally depends on individuals' having "genuine choice" is novel).
70 Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937) (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1).
71 Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2575-2609 (2012) (failing to address whether Individual Mandate serves general welfare). As of the date of publication, a search
of the federal reports indicates that no federal courts have addressed whether the Individual Mandate satisfies the Constitution's general welfare requirement.
72 Hanson, 27 Iowa at 50 (emphasis in original).
73 Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2579 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176 (1803)).
74 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 179 (1803)); see also supra note 30 (describing Chief
Justice Robert's reference to Marbury in Sebelius opinion).
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IV. CONCLUSION

"It is far easier to keep power from the hands of government officials than it is to wrest it back from them once it has been conferred. We
had our chance with the commerce clause, and we have lost it.'' 5 It appears that, after Sebelius, Professor Epstein's asseveration regarding the
Commerce Clause may also be true of the Taxing and Spending Clause.
By allowing Congress not only to tax those who do not purchase products
from a group of privately owned companies, but also to cloak that tax in
penal clothing, the Supreme Court has opened the door to new and innovative exercises of Congress's Taxing and Spending power, and has foreclosed the possibility of cabining such innovation with anything short of a
constitutional amendment or a federal court willing to candidly address
whether the Individual Mandate complies with the Constitution's general
76
welfare requirement .
If federal courts are to give some teeth to the Constitution's command that Congress is to tax and spend only for the "general Welfare,"
they will not be without a framework for doing so.
Professor Robert G.
Natelson has put forth the interesting idea of applying founding erafiduciary law to congressional expenditures made under the Taxing and
Spending Clause to determine their constitutionality.
Professor Natelson
suggests that, when faced with a preliminary showing of a tax's private partiality, courts should call upon the government to "justify any apparent partiality by showing how the appropriation furthers an actual, legitimate purpose," under a standard that is "higher than that now applied (if any is
really applied), but not high enough to be intrusive or unworkable .... ."'0
In the context of such an analysis as it applies to expenditures, a
showing that the expenditure served "an actual, legitimate purpose," would
be two prong: first, the government would have to point to language in the
Constitution, aside from the words "tax and spend," that authorizes Con-

75 Epstein, supra note 52, at 1455.
76

See supra note 38 and accompanying text (describing Court's abdication of definitional

authority over "general Welfare" limit on congressional taxing power).
77 See supra note 37 and accompanying text (describing early case linking congressional taxing power to "general Welfare" limitation); see also supra note 36 and accompanying text (describing limit on congressional taxing power that was used as rhetorical device in Marbury).
78 See Natelson, supra note 42, at 269-80 (discussing application of fiduciary law to taxpayers' challenges of expenditures' constitutionality).
79 See id.
so See id. at 280; see also Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937) (citing U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 1) (holding that unless "a display of arbitrary power," tax is immune from judicial
invalidation).
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gress to work toward the end toward which the money is being spent; and
second, the government would have to demonstrate that the money is actually being spent toward that end, and not for some other purpose.81
A similar analysis could allow for challenges to congressional ex-2
actions of money made pursuant to the Taxing and Spending Clause.
This would require those wishing to challenge the constitutionality of a particular tax to offer prima facie evidence that its purpose, when viewed from
the perspective of the "general Welfare," is "clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an exercise of judgment."8 3 Such a showing might be
made with proof of the following assertions:
*

the Individual Mandate was designed to give effect to private insurers' desire
to pressure individuals into purchasing
84
their products;

*

it will succeed in doing so by penalizing millions of Americans who do not purchase
such products, and raising $7
5
billion in the process;1

*

private healthcare companies called for the Individual
Mandate years before it was enacted, spent large sums of
money on lobbying efforts in the lead up to the Affordable
Care Act becoming law, and the ten United States Senators
who received the most money from them refrained from
endorsing a public option, which was an alternative
to the
6
Mandate that more Americans supported;

81 See Natelson, supra note 42, at 269-80.
82 See supra note 43 and accompanying text (explaining procedure for challenging Individual

Mandate's constitutionality).
83 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (authorizing Congress to tax and spend pursuant to "general
Welfare"); see also Helvering, 301 U.S. at 640 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1).
84 See supra note 44 and accompanying text (describing accounts of how private insurers
lobbied for and benefit from Individual Mandate); McGreal, supra note 44 (quoting Harvard Professor and co-founder of Physicians for National Health Programme Dr. Steffie Woolhander)
("[The Individual Mandate] 'use[s] the coercive power of the state to force people to hand their
money over to a private entity which is the private insurance industry. That is not what people
were promised."').
85 See Congressional Budget Office, supra note 19, at 1 ("[A]bout 6 million people will pay a
penalty because they are uninsured in 2016 ...[and] total collections will be about $7 billion in
2016 ...").
86 See AMERICA'S HEALTH INSURANCE PLANS, supra note 44, at 1-11; Kiersh, supra note 44
("Health care PACs alone have already donated $4.9 million to federal candidates this year after
contributing $49.3 million and $39.8 million in the 2008 and 2006 cycles, respectively.").

2013-2014]

INDIVIDUAL MANDATE

*

politicians used disingenuous techniques
to coopt public
8
support for the Individual Mandate;

*

politicians went so far as to read lobbyists' statements verbatim into the public record in efforts to enact legislation
favorable to private entities; 8 and

*

the administration has explicitly voiced its intent to cooperate with private businesses regarding the Employer Mandate, while rebuffing calls from Congress to delay the Individual Mandate. 89

The weight of this evidence, and the fact that the Supreme Court
has not yet been asked to pass upon whether the Individual Mandate was
enacted pursuant to the general welfare, 90 may serve to ameliorate lower
87

See supra note 24 and accompanying text (analyzing administration denying that Individu-

al Mandate is tax, but then describing it as one); supra note 40 and accompanying text (describing
negative ramifications of coopting support for tax by denying that it is tax). Marc. A. Thiessen
described Obamacare as involving the "involuntary transfer of millions of people out of private
health insurance they were happy with into Obamacare plans they did not want - all in violation
of President Obama's promise that if you've got health insurance you like 'you can keep your
plan."' Thiessen, supra note 19.
88 See Pear, supra note 44, at Al.
89 See Jarrett, supra note 19; Weisman & Pear, supra note 19, at A15 (quoting House Speaker John Boehner) ("Is it fair for the president of the United States to give American businesses an
exemption from his health care law's mandates without giving the same exemption to the rest of
America? Hell no, it's not fair."); Thiessen, supra note 19 ("Remember when Democrats voted to
keep the government shut down rather than accept a delay in the individual mandate? Now that
the Obamacare implosion is dominating the news, they are falling over each to see who gets credit for a delay."). Congressman Michael Burgess's comment that insurance companies "got everything they wanted" when the Individual Mandate was enacted provides excellent fodder for a
claim that passage of the Individual Mandate is a function of serving private interests, not the
general welfare. See Burgess, supra note 44.
90 One group of plaintiffs' pre-Sebelius brief challenged the Individual Mandate's compliance with the General Welfare Clause by perfunctorily arguing that "Congress' actions and its
words clearly communicate that the penalty provisions in the individual and employer mandates
are penalties, not taxes, and therefore could not have been enacted pursuant to Congress' power to
tax and spend for the general welfare under Article I, §8." Opening Brief of Appellants, Liberty
University, Inc. v. Lew, 733 F.3d 72 (4th Cir. 2012) (No. 10-2347), 2011 WL 145515, at *43.
Their reply brief noted that, while "the issue of Congress' power to enact the Mandates under the
Taxing and Spending Clause [is] not before this Court," and that many pre-Sebelius decisions, as
well as President Obama in the Stephanopoulos interview, had rejected the notion that the Individual Mandate was a tax. Reply Brief of Appellants, Liberty University, Inc. v. Lew, 733 F.3d
72 (4th Cir. 2012) (No. 10-2347), 2011 WL 758478, at *26-*27. However, the Plaintiff's supplemental post-Sebelius brief made no mention of the General Welfare Clause. Supplemental
Opening Brief on Remand of Appellants, Liberty University, Inc. v. Lew, 733 F.3d 72 (4th Cir.
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federal courts' fear of reversal on appeal if they are to decide that the Mandate contravenes this constitutional limit. Moreover, the Supreme Court
has now signed off on politicians selling a tax by cloaking it in penal clothing, 91 and this constrains voters who wish to politically prevent Congress
from enacting taxes that they oppose. Voters must be armed with accurate
information in order to properly decide which candidates to vote for, and so
long as politicians are allowed to pull the wool over constituents' eyes,
there is no way to prospectively ascertain what Members of Congress intend to do with Congress's taxing authorities. Hopefully federal courts will
come around to the fact that this unbridled and disingenuous exercise of the
federal taxing power, which is and should be an essentially legislative function, has now gone too far, and therefore calls out for a judicial remedy.
Luke J. Rosseel

2012) (No. 10-2347), 2013 WL 708193. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals summarily disposed of the General Welfare argument by stating that "the Supreme Court held that the individual mandate exaction constituted a tax and that Congress acted well within the scope of its constitutionally granted authority in imposing it." Lew, 733 F.3d at 95. It remains to be seen whether a
plaintiff who offers evidence to fully develop the Individual Mandate's inconsistency with the
General Welfare Clause will be able to capture a court's attention.
91 See Stephanopoulos, supra note 24 (relating instance of President Obama rejecting notion
that Individual Mandate is tax); supra notes 25-27 (describing Court's holding in Sebelius).

